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The 2014 European Parliament elections were widely construed as a major shock to the political 
narrative of European integration. A range of parties either skeptical of or openly opposed to the 
European Union saw major gains, including UKIP in Great Britain, the Front National in France, 
and the Five Star Movement in Italy. Though a diverse lot, the collective success of these parties 
triggered concern within pro-European parties and the EU institutions, and featured in the 
opposition from some heads of government to Jean-Claude Juncker’s appointment as 
Commission President. A key question, then, is whether these electoral developments reflect a 
popular rejection of the narrative of integration. The academic study of party-based 
Euroskepticism can help us answer this, but to do so it must come to terms with the diversity of 
anti-establishment voices. Building on earlier textual analysis of UKIP, I propose to go beyond 
the hard/soft Euroskepticism distinction and map these parties in terms of the broader arguments 
that underpin their claims against the EU. In addition to improving our understanding of the 
political developments themselves, this can also inform ongoing debates about the Union’s 
constitutional structure. In particular, I distinguish between populist and nationalist grounds for 
Euroskepticism, which cast very different lights on the “democratic deficit” and how to fix it. 
 
 
 The 2014 elections to European Parliament (or simply the “Euro elections”) were at once 
fairly prosaic and quite momentous. At the top line, as it were, there was only a small change as 
the center-right European People’s Party (EPP) lost ground to its socialist opposition, but 
retained its plurality. Among the smaller parties, however, the election made headlines due to the 
marked success of radical and anti-establishment parties, especially those skeptical of (or 
opposed to) European integration. Among these were Britain’s UK Independence Party (UKIP) 
and France’s Front National (FN), which achieved unprecedented first-place finishes in their 
countries. The success of such parties attracted broad attention as evidence of a wave of public 
                                                            
1 The author would like to thank Joseph Quinn for excellent research assistance, as well to acknowledge the 
American University Office of the Vice-Provost for Research for financial support on earlier versions of this project. 
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Euroskepticism across the continent—The Economist (2014) ran an article with the headline 
“The Euroskeptic Union,” noting that “populist” and “antiestablishment” parties had received a 
quarter of the vote or more in member states as diverse as Greece, Italy, Denmark, Britain, and 
France. This concern even reached the level of intergovernmental deliberations, when a group of 
anti-federalist heads of government led by the UK’s David Cameron tried unsuccessfully to 
block the appointment of EPP nominee Jean-Claude Junker as Commission President. Recent 
convention (intended to democratize the European Commission) holds that the President should 
be chosen by the largest party in the parliamentary election, but Cameron used the rise of 
Euroskeptic parties as evidence for his argument that the federalist Junker was in fact out of 
touch with the democratic will (Doyle and Martin 2014).  
 Though this particular intervention in the constitutional machinery of the EU failed 
(Junker was duly selected), the arguments made by these parties are not going away, and promise 
to figure into future constitutional debates. But these debates are never yes-no questions about 
being for or against Europe; likewise, these parties are making a range of specific claims, 
reflective of their own ideologies, political interests, and national circumstances. Thus, 
understanding the significance of the Euroskeptic electoral wave means unpacking the anti-EU 
discourse that these parties present. In this paper, I propose to do so through a specific analytical 
framework, one which focuses on the distinction between populist and nationalist bases for 
Euroskeptic claims. As I will discuss, there is an important difference between opposing Europe 
because it is part-and-parcel of the general disenfranchisement of “the people,” and because it is 
a specifically foreign interference with the principle of national sovereignty. Among other things, 
this difference affects whether democratization or de-integration is the most pressing need for 
addressing the “democratic deficit.” 
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 My argument is structured as follows: In the first section, I (very briefly) review the 
literature on populism and nationalism in order to show how these can help us typologize 
different ways of articulating claims against European integration. I then proceed to preliminary 
analysis of four different parties within the (broadly-defined) Euroskeptic grouping: the 
aforementioned UKIP and FN, the Italian Lega Nord, and Greece’s Golden Dawn. These short 
case studies are intended only to be illustrative of the framework I’ve developed, and exploratory 
of agenda for further research in this direction. Finally, I conclude by discussing the potential 
political implications of the different varieties of Euroskeptic claims. 
 
The Case(s) against Europe: Varieties of Euroskepticism 
To properly identify and explicate the challenge that these anti-establishment parties pose 
to their mainstream competitors and the European project as a whole, we need a new approach to 
categorizing political parties that moves beyond the existing silos of “left or right parties,” 
“regional parties,” etc. Studies of anti-EU parties often focus on distinguishing “hard” and “soft” 
Euroskeptics (Szczerbiak and Taggart 2003, 2008); the latter, also called “Eurorejectionism” 
(Kopecky and Mudde 2002), reject both the principle of ever closer union as well as the current 
state of the EU institutions.2 It is this rejectionist position that is notable in many of the emergent 
parties in the recent European Parliament elections, such as UKIP. In any case, most of these 
distinctions are built on mapping policy positions, or (for more traditional left-right divides) 
identifying the social status of their supporters.  
I propose instead that we proceed by analyzing the “claims-making” of parties, not just 
who they are and what they stand for, but how they make their arguments in the context of 
                                                            
2 Note that while “Euroskepticism” has become broadly accepted in academic and political discourse, more specific 
terms are still contested. For example, party sympathizers prefer the more positive “Eurorealist” (Gardner, 2006), 
but Kopecky and Mudde’s (2002) similar-sounding “Europragmatist” refers to a different current entirely. 
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political talk and text. In this case, I suggest examining the way that anti-establishment parties in 
the European Parliament frame and justify their Euroskeptic claims. On a theoretical and 
methodological level, this can be seen as an incorporation of party politics into the tradition of 
rhetorical political studies (Finlayson and Martin 2008), which has tended to focus on the 
rhetorical performances of individual leaders (though see Atkins 2011). While leaders’ 
personality, styles, and beliefs are undeniably important in shaping the language that is used, that 
rhetorical language also contributes to binding and defining parties—as well as giving shape to 
the region-wide political debates . Thus, understanding the details of speeches and texts is 
equally important to understanding parties as organized actors.  
Note that I refer to claims-making rather than argumentation, as is more common in 
rhetorical or “political discourse” studies (Finlayson and Martin 2008; Fairclough and Fairclough 
2012). This is for three reasons: First, I wish to deemphasize the process of collective 
deliberation and decision-making, in order to focus on the claims of individual parties. Second, I 
want to emphasize the fundamentally contentious nature of the politics around European 
integration—in the contentious politics tradition, these anti-EU claims would be categorized as 
either “programme” or “standing” claims (Tilly and Tarrow 2007: 83-85). Though made by 
parties in this case rather than social movements (though the line is admittedly fuzzy in the case 
of, say, UKIP in the 1990s), the claims are much the same. Finally, I want to suggest that, in 
practice, the political claims often blur together with truth claims. It has often been empirical 
claims about the nature of contemporary Europe that underpin the normative (or deontic) 
imperative of opposing the European Union. The former are often contestable claims, but they 
are presented as taken for granted in the context of the political arguments. This echoes a social 
constructionist understanding of what would come to be called contentious politics as “the 
5 
 
activities of individuals or groups making assertions of grievances and claims with respect to 
some putative conditions” (Spector and Kitsuse 1977: 75).  
Obviously, there are many ways in which a party’s claims might be analyzed. A similarly 
worthy analysis of these same parties, for example, might focus on the particular ways in which 
their claims about immigration are structured. However, in order to understand the significance 
of the current Euroskeptic challenge, I propose two ideal-typical modes of anti-EU claim: 
populist and nationalist. Each of these concepts is the subject of a wide literature in its own right, 
of course, and in the sections below I (very briefly) discuss those literatures and proceed to 
discuss what kinds of Euroskepticism they imply. 
 
Populism 
Populist claims-making will be the most familiar to scholars of European parties 
(particularly right-wing parties) and party systems. Over the past two decades, there has been 
substantial academic attention to the origins and characteristics of an emergent (or re-emergent) 
European family of right-wing populist parties. This type of party has been given several 
different labels in the literature (associated with slightly different definitions): Abedi refers to 
“right wing-populist Anti-Political Establishment (APE)” parties (2004); Cas Mudde 
influentially coined “populist radical right parties” (PRRPs) (2007); while Eatwell settles for “the 
extreme right” in reference to many of the same parties (2000). In recent years, this conceptual 
framework has been applied to many of the prominent Euroskeptic parties across the continent, 
such as UKIP (Abedi and Lundberg 2009: 71).  
A full review of this literature is beyond the scope of this paper. For the purpose of 
analyzing different Euroskeptic claims, the element I extract from these approaches is a 
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particularly definition of “populism.” As defined by Mudde in his influential study of PRRPs, 
populism “is a thin-centered ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two 
homogenous and antagonistic groups, the ‘pure people’ versus the ‘corrupt elite,’ (2007: 23). 
While Mudde’s search for the distinctive core features of the PRRP phenomenon is a different 
goal from my analysis, three things are important about this definition: First, he makes note of 
the fact that populism is “not merely a political style” (Mudde 2007: 23). Second, there is a clear 
political claim about the current state of politics, that the greatest threat to society is the 
corruption of the elite and powerlessness of the masses. And third, there is a corresponding claim 
about political legitimacy, that it “should be an expression of the volonté générale” (Mudde 
2007: 23).  
Applied to the varieties of anti-EU claims, this suggests a particular species of “populist 
Euroskeptic” argument. Such an argument holds that European integration is to be opposed 
because it is part of the general conflict the corrupt elites and the masses that also happens at the 
domestic level, and is a uniquely sharp example of unaccountable institutions taking decisions 
contrary to the interests of the people. This claim would logically not make a firm distinction 
between the actions of domestic elites and the European institutions. Stylistically, such party 
rhetoric will emphasize “the people” or “citizens,” and oppose these to some broadly-defined 
threat (so as to encompass both domestic- and European-level opponents). Finally, they will be 
more likely to invoke ethnic and religious tensions in making their complaints against Europe—
that is, in some way rendering them as the EU’s fault, as opposed to general xenophobic speech 
which properly belongs to the other parts of the party discourse beyond Euroskepticism (and is 
outside of this analysis). 
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Nationalism 
But populism—the general opposition between masses and elites, which exists at the 
European level in parallel with the domestic level—is not the only way to formulate a political 
claim against the EU and the process of European integration generally. Where Europe is seen 
primarily as a distinctly supranational entity—inherently violating the principle that political 
authority must be congruent with the national unit in order to be legitimate—the claim is better 
described as a nationalist one.  
“Nationalism” is of course a long-contested concept in social science, encompassing 
political, cultural, and sociological conceptions of what it means to be and become a “nation.” 
Gellner famously articulated nationalism “a political principle, which holds that the political and 
national unit should be congruent” (1983: 1). This definition can be useful regardless of the 
particular content assigned to the signifier “national unit.” It is this point, the nature of the 
national unit and its historical development, which occupies much of the voluminous nationalism 
literature. Anderson (1983), for example, argues that nations are a kind of “imagined 
communities” which emerged from the socioeconomic processes of modernization, particularly 
print capitalism. By contrast, the ethnosymbolist school associated with Armstrong (1982) and 
Smith (1991) focuses on the necessity of long-standing ethnic symbols (like founding myths) for 
modern national identities to exist. Other scholarship on nationalism has engaged with different 
models of nationhood, such as the ethnic versus civic nationalism question (Ignatieff 1993) and 
the idea of a “new nationalism,” which again do not necessarily conflict with nationalism as a 
generic principle of political legitimacy. 
I thus return here to Gellner’s notion of a political claim because my aim is to analyze 
party discourses in their political contexts, rather than to evaluate or historicize their respective 
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imagined communities. According to this understanding, then, nationalist Euroskepticism entails 
a different structure and style of argument from that of its populist analogue. The nationalist 
claim is that deep European integration is by definition illegitimate, because it attaches political 
power to something other than the national unit. More concretely, this will take the form of 
arguments that focus on conflict between states and the European institutions, generally taking 
for granted the normative preference for the former (e.g., that states will naturally be best placed 
to respond to the lingering economic crisis, if only allowed a free hand in their policies). 
 
Case Studies in Euroskepticism 
 In this section I aim to illustrate the empirical application of this framework with four 
very brief case studies of Euroskeptic parties that achieved relative success in the 2015 Euro 
elections, and espouse different claims on the populist-nationalist spectrum: the UK 
Independence Party, the Front National (of France), the Lega Nord (of Italy), and Golden Dawn 
(of Greece). In each of these sketches, I first situate the party in the contemporary literature, with 
a particular focus on what those analyses suggest in terms of populist or nationalist orientations. I 
then present and discuss some illustrative (not dispositive) textual evidence in the form of 
extracts from European Parliament speeches given by MEPs representing the party. The aim here 
is not yet to provide a full empirical analysis, but to develop the theoretical perspective outlined 
above by showing what populist and nationalist claims look like in the context of actual rhetoric.  
 
UK Independence Party 
UKIP has emerged as a major challenger to the political establishment in Britain, as well 
as a regional standard-bearer of Euroskepticism as a central party goal. Currently led by Nigel 
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Farage (who has been an insider since the party’s 1993 foundation), it distinguishes itself as the 
British party calling simply and directly for UK withdrawal from the European Union. The party 
finished first with 27% of the vote in the 2014 European Parliament election (the first time that 
anyone other than the Labour and Conservative Parties has achieved this since the 1979 advent 
of directly-elected MEPs), and took its first seats elected seats in Westminster with two by-
election victories.3 Moreover, pressure from UKIP has been keenly felt by the ruling 
Conservatives, with Prime Minister David Cameron promising to renegotiate Britain’s role in 
Europe and hold an “in-out” referendum on EU membership in the next Parliament (should his 
party be re-elected; Mason 2014). Whatever the eventual fate of that promise, it is already clear 
that these parties are making a mark on what has long been considered a two- (or at most three-) 
party system. And at the European level, though Britain is already known as one of the member 
states least dedicated to integration, the rise of UKIP is likely to exacerbate tensions. 
The study of the party has generally been divided between understanding it as a single-
issue Euroskeptic party and understanding it as part of the larger wave of right-wing populism in 
Europe. Key to the first is the simple pair of observations that the party opposes continued EU 
membership and that throughout its existence a sizeable portion of the British public has 
expressed deep misgivings about the process of European integration—the percentage who say 
they would vote for withdrawal in a hypothetical referendum has hovered around 40% between 
1994 and 2003 (Baker et al. 2008: 104).4 The simplest frame for interpreting the party, then, is as 
a “single-issue party” carrying the banner of British Euroskepticism (Usherwood 2008). The 
practical consequence of this approach has been a focus on the structural challenges facing 
single-issue parties, to the exclusion of other relevant dynamics. According to Simon 
                                                            
3 Not counting a handful of defections by sitting MPs and peers. 
4 It should be acknowledged, however, that the electoral math is not quite this simple: During the same period, the 
number who considered Europe an “important issue” only averaged about 30% (Baker et al. 2008: 106).  
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Usherwood, the party’s history has been defined by a fundamental tension “between those who 
feel that the objective is fundamental to the nature of the party and cannot be compromised at 
any point, and those who accept a need to be flexible in the short run, in order to have a better 
chance of achieving the objective in the longer term” (2008: 256). Thus, for example, the 
organizational advantages gained by the party taking up seats in the European Parliament 
outweighed concerns about legitimizing that institution. Of course, this is not without cost in 
terms of internal dissension, with the grassroots supporters of most single-issue parties favoring 
ideals over expedience (Usherwood 2008: 261).  
This approach implicitly challenges the conventional wisdom that considers European 
issues (and European elections) to be of the “second-order,” subordinate to the “first-order” 
competition between parties of government over bread-and-butter issues (Reif and Schmitt 1980; 
Marsh 1998). However, the existence of independent Euroskeptic parties suggests that a growing 
number of voters consider European integration a first-order issue. This is reinforced by data 
showing that the pattern of Euroskeptic mobilization in the UK tends to track European rather 
than domestic political events (Usherwood 2007), and by an increasing recognition of social 
movement-style opposition to the EU outside of the party system (Fitzgibbon 2013). Still, 
outside of these advances over existing approaches, this line of analysis has spoken more to the 
study of Euroskepticism as an idea than to party politics as a field (i.e., in its framing as “party-
based Euroskepticism;” Szczerbiak and Taggart 2003). 
 The second main approach associates UKIP with populist radical right parties, drawing 
on the literature discussed above. Abedi and Lundberg use the term “populist anti-political 
establishment party,” arguing that UKIP is populist in that it “asserts that there is a fundamental 
divide between the political establishment and the people” and anti-establishment in that it 
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“challenges the status quo in terms of major policy issues and political system issues” (2009: 
74).5 The additional prefix “right-wing” is not often systematically addressed, but has become a 
commonplace in reference to UKIP’s mostly-Tory origins and its positions on immigration and 
the welfare state. This overall approach has been empirically developed in two ways: On the first 
account, Abedi and Lundberg document examples of populist logic in UKIP communications, 
such as claims that all of the establishment parties are basically the same and that its own leaders 
do not consider themselves politicians, but rather “people from all backgrounds who feel deeply 
what the majority of British people feel” (2009: 76). They also note that the explicit EU 
withdrawal position is not only a challenge to the status quo in policy terms, but an attempt to 
“turn back the clock” in terms of the British constitution (2009: 75). In terms of indirect evidence 
about the party, Lynch, Whitaker, and Loomes present data from election surveys in 2009 and 
2010. These data show that UKIP votes tended to correlate geographically with votes from the 
far-right British National Party, and that the party’s voters were “slightly older, more likely to be 
male, white and drawn from social classes C2, D and E [killed working class, working class, and 
non-working], but less likely to have a degree, compared with voters for the three main parties” 
(2012: 747-49).  
 However, in terms of the ideal-types outlined earlier, UKIP’s claims about Europe 
(setting aside domestic issues, the social base of its support, etc.) are distinctly nationalist: The 
party is organized around the fundamental argument that the ills of British society could be 
largely ameliorated if only the country were ruled exclusively from Westminster, free of foreign 
imposition from Brussels. Indeed, this framing is one of the things that differentiates UKIP from 
the British National Party (whose shadow it is always keen to escape), because the latter party’s 
                                                            
5 Abedi and Lundberg include a third criterion for populist anti-political establishment parties, “[a] party that 
perceives itself as a challenger to the parties that make up the political establishment” (2009: 74), which seems 
redundant in light of the other two, but certainly applies to UKIP. 
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extremist populism implies that a significant political reorganization of the UK—not just its 
liberation from the EU—would be necessary. This kind of nationalism—an avowedly forward-
looking version, of which UKIP is fond, likely to further distance themselves from the extreme 
right—is reflected in this passage from the party’s 2010 manifesto: 
While UKIP is realistic about the difficult economic and political challenges Britain 
faces, we take a positive view of Britain’s place in the world - a stark contrast to the 
defeatist and apologetic stance taken by other parties. UKIP recognises Britain as a global 
player with a global destiny and not a regional state within a “United States of Europe.” 
(UKIP 2010: 10) 
And indeed, it is also reflected in their interventions in European political discourse, such as this 
declaration by Farage in a June 2014 European Parliament debate following a meeting of the 
European Council: “We are the ones who want democracy, we are the ones who want nation 
states, we are the ones who want a global future for our countries, and do not want to be trapped 
inside this museum.” In other words, supranational governance is construed as problematic 
because it represents a major restraint on states’ ability to achieve the progress that would 
naturally be possible (or so it is implied) absent the imposition of Europe. 
 
Front National 
 France’s FN is one of them most controversial and enduring radical-right parties in 
Western Europe, most famously disrupting French politics and attracting worldwide attention 
when then-leader Jean-Marie Le Pen bested the Socialist candidate and reached the Presidential 
run-off in 2002. Though that peak heralded the beginning of a decline in popularity for the party, 
it has recently become resurgent under the leadership of Le Pen’s daughter Marine. The FN of 
Marine Le Pen has established itself as a key player in the contemporary wave of anti-
establishment parties in the European Parliament, on the strength of a resounding first place 
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showing in the 2015 EP elections in France.6 Though the party’s far-right reputation has made 
formal cooperation with other parties difficult—including a public spat between Le Pen and 
UKIP’s Farage (Owen 2014)—it is an important party to consider in this analysis because of its 
recent success (in one of the EU’s largest members) and its historical role as a paragon of right-
wing populism. 
 Indeed, in the literature on the radical right, the FN was always a subject of particular 
attention; Mudde calls it the “most famous” such party and notes that it is “considered the 
prototype by various scholars” (2007: 41, citing Davies 1999 and Simmons 1996). As this 
language makes clear, the party as it existed under the leadership of Jean-Marie Le Pen was an 
archetypal populist party according to Mudde’s understanding (discussed above). Recent 
analyses of the party under Marine Le Pen, however, suggest its resurgence has been 
accompanied by a shift in its political claims. For example, Startin (2014) shows that, among 
other strategies, the party has had increasing success tapping into the Gaullist legacy in France to 
build up its own legitimacy. Without delving into the literature on that concept, it is clear enough 
that Gaullism is not a populist ideology, and indeed was distinctly nationalist in its troubled 
relationship to the European project.7 This discourse accompanies a general move by the FN to 
integrate itself more into the French party system, while still retaining its oppositional policies 
(Shields 2014). One scholar, expressing the wide-sweep of this change and its success in 
attracting more young and female voters, calls it a “Marinisation” of the party and consequently 
of French politics (Stadelmann 2014). 
                                                            
6 The FN, received 24.85% of the votes cast only 20.80% for the center-right UMP and only 13.98% for the 
governing Socialist Party (European Parliament 2014). 
7 There is an obvious parallel here with UKIP’s desire (basically from its earliest days) to associate itself with 
Thatcherism. 
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 In other words, this literature suggests that the FN is moving away from its “prototypical” 
populist right-wing alignment, and possibly toward the nationalist pole as I have defined it 
(especially if the party continues to appropriate the trappings of Gaullism). Turning then to 
evidence from recent EP debates, the following remarks from an FN MEP on the 2015 EU 
budget are illustrative: 
The vote on the 2015 budget showed again the exorbitant amount of unfunded liabilities, 
which are a form of debt to the Union. Taken together, they represent almost 30 billion 
euros in unpaid bills end of 2014 and about €220 billion of commitment authorizations 
not covered by payments. Therefore, what is the legitimacy of the Commission, which 
commits these monthly sanction procedures for excessive deficits against France and 
Italy, as she gathers herself these debts? That is the credibility of Mr. Juncker, who 
announced a multi-year program to invest an additional €300 billion, without specifying 
how it will be funded? Ultimately, it is still the Member States who will be involved, 
unless a European tax is founded…European leaders will find its justification.  
(Monot 2014; emphasis added) 
 
Most notable here is the particular focus on the relationship between the EU and the member 
states, as in the italicized passages. Despite invoking sensitive issues of taxation and spending, 
there are no references (directly or indirectly) to the people, as we would expect from a populist 
Euroskeptic claim. Instead, as we would expect from a nationalist Euroskeptic claim, the basic 
argument is that the member states have a legitimate right to organize their economies (including 
running deficits), and that it is the supranational authority which exceeds its ambit when it 
sanctions their fiscal decisions and aims to usurp their monopoly on taxation. Again, the same 
Euroskeptic attack on the EU budget could be made in other ways, but the fact that it takes a 
nationalist form here is relevant. Of course, I do not claim that this is completely representative 
of FN discourse, or empirical proof that “Marinisation” is happening,8 but I do suggest that it 
keenly illustrates the analysis of claims-making in terms of these ideal-types. 
                                                            
8 In a related economic debate, a different FN MEP made a clear (if not especially radical) populist claim in 
complaining that “even as people undergo an economic crisis that never ends , this report proposes nothing less than 
to continue the policy of austerity which we can only see harm” (Bilde 2015). 
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Lega Nord 
 The Italian LN is another radical party that has been widely studied in the literature, 
though it is somewhat less of a clear-cut member of the populist radical right party family (it is 
excluded for example in Ignazi 2003). The party’s support for an autonomous “Padania” 
(comprising the northern regions of Italy) represents the regionalist current among populist 
radical right parties, in which the enemy of the people is located “within the state [but] outside 
the nation” (Mudde 2007: 69). In this case, the corrupting influence being the people of central 
and southern Italy (with Rome as the metonymic villain). Like the FN, the Lega has undergone a 
change of leadership, from longtime leader Umberto Bossi to Roberto Maroni and then Matteo 
Salvini. The path of the two parties, however, has been substantially different. The LN under 
Bossi was fairly pro-European, while being staunchly nationalist in the Italian context (like a 
right-wing analogue of the Scottish National Party). Under Maroni and (especially) Salvini, this 
position has reversed: The party has adopted more stridently Euroskeptic policies (such as 
opposition to the Euro), allied itself with other right-wing Euroskeptics (as with UKIP in the 
now-defunct Europe of Freedom and Democracy group), and substantially downplayed its 
federalist and separatist roots.  
The strategy has paid-off with modest but stable showings in recent elections,9 including 
advances among new groups of voters. The latter gains, it has been suggested, show the potential 
for a durable rise in the party’s support (Passarelli and Tuorto 2012). Most radically of all, given 
its origins, the party has recently begun to organize a sister party in the south—Noi con Salvini, 
meaning simply “Us with Salvini”—which would act alongside the LN as a new right-wing 
                                                            
9 In the 2014 Euro elections the LN finished fourth with 6.2% of the vote (European Parliament 2014). This was a 
slight decline from 2009, but an improvement on their showing in the 2013 General Election. 
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Euroskeptic opposition party at the national level (Binnie 2015). At least domestically, the party 
will not be able to maintain separatist nationalism as one of its central claims, but a complete 
reversal and acceptance of Italian state nationalism seems unlikely. As a result, it is probable that 
Salvini’s new network of parties will need to rely more heavily on the populist element of its 
identity to present a coherent electoral appeal.  
Assuming that this tendency is extended to the party’s European discourse, it may look 
something like this intervention in the debate on the FY 2015 EU budget: 
Having blamed the crisis on Member States, after imposing austerity measures costing 
blood and tears to their citizens, Europe today presents its accounts. Ahead of the 25 
million unemployed Europeans and 3 million Italians who despite having a job live in 
hardship without being able to afford a decent meal or a roof over their heads, Europe is 
asking for more money. In a time when people need support and services and companies 
seek new funds to promote their competitiveness, the EU should be the first to set a good 
example.  
(Bizzotto 2015) 
There is a clear contrast between the way that this claim is expressed and the way that the FN 
structured its own critique of the budget process (see above). Though the member states are 
mentioned in the first sentence, this is merely in giving an example of EU buck-passing. The 
core of the argument is about the hardship faced by average citizens and the uncomprehending 
and heartless response they have received from the European institutions. The populist rather 
than nationalist orientation of this claim can also be seen in the parallel references to Europeans 
and Italians in the second sentence: This is not primarily a narrative of foreign imposition, but 
one about the shared struggle of European masses against uncaring elites. Finally (and setting 
aside the populism/nationalism question), it is worth noting that this passages illustrates the 
limits of the conventional left-right model for understanding debates at the European level, since 
this exact passage could easily have been presented by a party of the radical left.   
 
17 
 
Golden Dawn 
 The most extreme right of the parties covered here, by almost any measure, is Greece’s 
Golden Dawn, led from its inception by Nikolaos Michaloliakos (a former Greek Army 
commando dismissed because of involvement in far-right political violence). Having its roots in 
a (very small) social movement in the 1980s advocating for a return to military government, the 
party’s recent success in the context of widespread social unrest has been interpreted as a 
significant threat to Greek democracy (Bistis 2013). Though not as successful in the Euro 
elections as UKIP or FN, Golden Dawn still finished third with 9.45% of the vote (European 
Parliament 2014). This was a 20-fold increase over its prior showing, and a fairly striking result 
for an extremist party. Obviously, this owes much to the depth and extent of the economic crisis 
in Greece (Koronaiou and Sakellariou 2013; Angouri and Wodak 2014), and may not represent a 
lasting challenge to Greek party politics. However, the apprehension associated with having such 
parties sitting in the European Parliament may make their particular contributions to European 
debates even more relevant, inasmuch as they will shape mainstream responses. 
 In terms of the right-wing populism literature, Golden Dawn has not received as much 
attention as the preceding parties. In part this is because of its recent ascendance, but also 
because of questions of categorization: Mudde excludes parties like this from his category of 
populist radical right because he considers support for democratic principles necessary for his 
conception of populism (2007: 49-50).10 Indeed, the party is notable for not even including 
provisions for democratic deliberation in its internal governance, preferring a military model 
(Ellinas 2014). However, this is an unnecessarily narrow definition. Given the basic definition 
(discussed earlier) of populism as the belief in a society fundamentally divided between the 
                                                            
10 The most significant Greek party included in Mudde’s (2007) analysis is the Popular Orthodox Rally (also known 
by the Greek acronym LAOS), the electoral fortunes of which have declined substantially alongside the rise of 
Golden Dawn.   
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people and corrupted elites and outsiders, Golden Dawn fits well. In fact, populism appears to be 
a major organizing philosophy for the party and a key to its success: “One of the party’s main 
publicized activities is helping Greek people in the community facing increasingly serious 
problems in many aspects of their daily lives as a result of the economic crisis” (Koronaiou and 
Sakellariou 2013). This behavior, which is always very clearly limited to aiding ethnic Greeks 
(including offers to “protect” them from immigrants in various ways; Dalakoglou 2013: 518), 
has been used to categorize the party as nationalist. However, a distinction should be made 
between this ethno-nationalism and the political conception of nationalism that I outline above; 
the former can be seen as much more of a xenophobic species of populism (“ethno-populism,” 
essentially), for the reasons outlined by Mudde (2007: 69-73). 
 The evidence from European Parliament debates is mixed, however. Like FN, Golden 
Dawn’s ethno-populism translates into a blend of the nationalist and populist ideal-types at the 
European level. For example, in a debate on regional economic coordination, one Golden Dawn 
MEP explained that: 
I am voting against this particular report because it promotes the centrally controlled 
economic and social governance of member states, weakening the respective national 
governments. Also it disproportionately promotes many benefits to the Roma than for 
other citizens. 
(Synandinos 2014) 
In this passage, a claim about the centrality of national sovereignty (the normative value of 
which is entirely taken for granted) is juxtaposed with the classically right-populist claim that the 
people will suffer because of an unfair preference for an outsider group. Elsewhere, however, we 
see more ideal-typically populist claims: “I am voting against the draft European Union general 
budget, financial year 2015, because it shifts the center of gravity closer to the numbers and 
power than to their own citizens” (Fontoulis 2014). And when the new European Commissioners 
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were presented to the EP after the 2014 elections, Golden Dawn’s Georgios Epitideios11 made 
the following complaints about the process: 
But, the way in which the choice of commissioners is carried out is not really a very 
honorable one for us in the European Parliament. It is basically a formality; the 
Commissioners have been chosen by the countries in collaboration with the president of 
the European Commission and then what follows is that we are called upon to say yes or 
no to this choice. So this is a pure formality. For this reason we cannot exert any 
influence, we cannot really intervene. We could intervene if there were two candidates 
for each portfolio but until that happens this is just showcasing we are just under the 
illusion that we are participating in an exercise where we have no influence. 
  (Epitideios 2014) 
This is a more populist than nationalist argument, in that it focuses on a general lack of 
accountability rather than a particular imposition of Brussels on the nation-state. In addition, it is 
striking for being a precise and almost prosaic procedural claim. As with LN’s anti-austerity 
discourse, this is a reminder that a label like “extreme right” does not tell us everything about 
how these parties will participate in European political debates. And while this kind of claims-
making is unlikely to make headlines at home or abroad, it may yet reverberate in the echo 
chamber of elite discourse. 
 
Conclusion 
 The party analyses sketched above are a preliminary illustration of how the theoretical 
opposition between the nationalist and populist ideal-types of Euroskepticism can help us 
analyze the concrete talk and text of European political parties. Obviously, much more extensive 
textual analysis will be required to fully map the discourse of Europe’s major Euroskeptic parties 
(which seems from this initial foray to be a fairly complex and mixed picture), but any such 
analysis requires a theoretically-developed starting point. So, then, what is the significance of 
                                                            
11 Epitideios is one of Golden Dawn’s more eccentric figures, a retired general fond of wearing his uniform for 
political appearances (and, ironically, a former director of the EU Military Staff; Mac Con Uladh 2014). 
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this particular schematic for understanding these parties? I suggest that it shows promise in at 
least two ways: It can help us to explain the parties’ relative success in the recent period, and it 
tells us something important about how these Euroskeptic discourses intersect with broader 
debates around European integration. 
 The first point, of course, is a major analytical goal of conventional party politics: 
understanding why some parties succeed at some times and others do not. In this analysis, I am 
interested neither in being able to predict elections results, nor in giving specific advice to parties 
on successful strategies. However, I believe that this analytical approach can still help us to 
understand party success. Parties make rhetorical arguments not just in the hope that they will 
attract supporters, but also in an attempt to structure the overall terms of debate in ways that are 
more favorable to themselves than to their opponents—what I have elsewhere called “discursive 
heresthetics” (Dye forthcoming). More precisely mapping the nuances of these insurgent parties’ 
claims will allow us to better understand how they have apparently outmaneuvered larger parties 
on the battlefield of discursive politics. In terms of future research directions, this suggests both a 
particular attention Euroskeptic campaigning, as well as analysis of the relationship between 
these claims and other arguments. For example, it will be useful to examine the relationship 
between nationalist Euroskepticism and other kinds of nationalist claims (i.e., separatism). 
The second point is not about the parties themselves, but the significance of the claims 
that they’ve crafted to the broader political debates about the future of Europe. In particular, I 
suggest that the populist/nationalist distinction can tell us quite a bit about the perennial 
“democratic deficit” concern—a particularly important area to unpack because the widespread 
public support for radical Euroskeptic parties is and will be seen as another piece of evidence 
that the deficit is widening. Considering the major possibilities for democratic reform, I think 
21 
 
that the two claims point in very different directions: For populists, the democratic deficit is a 
systemic problem, a lack of meaningful voice for the people that extends from the local level to 
the supranational. Though the details would still be a matter of debate, democratization of the 
EU—greater powers for the elected parliament, new deliberative institutions, etc.—could 
plausibly answer that claim. On the other hand, European-level democracy is a contradiction in 
terms for ideal-typical nationalists (unless and until there were a European nationhood, which is 
unlikely in the near-term to say the very least). Only a return of powers to the nation-state—
increasing the role of national parliaments or rolling-back integration entirely—could 
satisfactorily answer this kind of claim. Meanwhile, a simple return of powers to national 
governments or parliaments as they stand would be cold comfort to pure populists who think 
their national leaders are as corrupt as all the rest. The existence of this pronounced tension 
shows the importance of learning more about the claims-making of opposition parties before 
hoping to counter their rise with structure reforms. 
Of course, it remains an open empirical question whether these parties and their fellow 
travelers would actually support or oppose particular reforms based on the analysis I’ve 
proposed. A populist party may have many reasons for supporting an increased role for national 
governments in decision making, just as nationalist parties have seen fit to leverage a 
strengthened European Parliament. But in addition to providing a plausible starting point for 
answering that investigation, I argue that this may have independent significance. Previous 
claims are not determinative of later developments—the parties have agency—but nor can they 
be freely dispensed with. The power of political claims-making is that it constructs a foundation 
onto which future arguments can be built, which will be more powerful the closer they hew to 
the original logic. And in a broader sense, these opposition claims serve to demarcate the terms 
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of debate around constitutional questions in Europe (even in dismissing them, the mainstream 
parties are essentially legitimating them as the lower bound of some range of ideas), which will 
in turn delineate the range of possible resolutions. 
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